Dividend Signalling And Sustainability by Hobbs, Jeffrey & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Archived version from NCDOCKS Institutional Repository http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/ 
Dividend Signalling And Sustainability
By: J. Hobbs and M.I. Schneller
Abstract
We examine the ‘disappearing dividends’ era documented by Fama and French (2001) with respect to the 
traditional theory of signalling, wherein the positive signal is one of high future cash flows and continued 
payments. We report several new findings. First, during the disappearing dividends era, dividends vanished not 
only because they were less frequently initiated – the oft-cited reason – but also because, once initiated, they were 
less likely to be sustained. Second, we find that although future performance does increase with dividend 
sustainability, performance is merely average for permanent payers and poor for temporary payers. Third, we find 
that the market responded favourably to initiations but did not distinguish ex-ante between short-run and long-
run payers. Fourth, we find that despite the market’s similar treatment of shorter- and longer-term payers, 
dividend sustainability was in fact predictable out of sample, using information strictly available to investors at the 
time of the announcement. Fifth, we find that performance is predictable through sustainability; the firms we 
predict to become permanent payers significantly outperform their counterparts in subsequent years. Overall, our 
findings run counter to the traditional signalling theory of dividends in terms of both overall firm performance 
and the market’s reaction to initiations.
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We examine the ‘disappearing dividends’ era documented by Fama and
French (2001) with respect to the traditional theory of signalling, wherein
the positive signal is one of high future cash flows and continued payments.
We report several new findings. First, during the disappearing dividends
era, dividends vanished not only because they were less frequently
initiated – the oft-cited reason – but also because, once initiated, they
were less likely to be sustained. Second, we find that although future
performance does increase with dividend sustainability, performance is
merely average for permanent payers and poor for temporary payers.
Third, we find that the market responded favourably to initiations but did
not distinguish ex-ante between short-run and long-run payers. Fourth, we
find that despite the market’s similar treatment of shorter- and longer-term
payers, dividend sustainability was in fact predictable out of sample, using
information strictly available to investors at the time of the announcement.
Fifth, we find that performance is predictable through sustainability; the
firms we predict to become permanent payers significantly outperform
their counterparts in subsequent years. Overall, our findings run counter to
the traditional signalling theory of dividends in terms of both overall firm
performance and the market’s reaction to initiations.
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I. Introduction
The signalling theory of dividends posits that firms
convey their optimism for the future by initiating
dividend payments. The basis of this theory derives
from a study by Lintner (1956), in which managers
from 28 companies were interviewed to determine
which factors were most instrumental in firms’
payout policies. Lintner found that not only were
dividends dependent upon the amount of cash needed
to finance projects in the short-term, but that they
also represented management’s belief in the sustain-
ability of company earnings over the long-term.
Thus, managers tended to increase or initiate payouts
only when they believed that subsequent earnings
would be high.
Empirical evidence indicates that investors respond
favourably to dividend increases and initiations; the
stock prices of firms that initiate dividends tend to
increase around the time of the initiation
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announcement (see Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Healy
and Palepu, 1988). Likewise, the signalling theory
implies that any subsequent decrease or elimination
of dividends will be viewed with extreme disfavour by
the financial markets (Healy and Palepu, 1988;
Michaely et al., 1995; Benartzi et al., 1997). The
perception that the market punishes dividend omit-
ting firms more than it rewards dividend initiating
firms is, according to Brav et al. (2005), the primary
cause of dividend ‘conservatism’ – the reluctance of
management to increase payments if it feels there is a
chance that long-run earnings will not be able to
sustain those payments.
In this study, we address five empirical questions in
the period preceding the ‘reappearing dividends’
trend documented by Julio and Ikenberry (2004).
First, just how sticky are dividends in light of the
signalling theory? Second, how closely related is the
sustainability of dividends to the future operating
performance of the firm? Third, does the market react
differently to the initiation announcements of long-
term payers than it does to the initiation announce-
ments of short-term payers? Fourth, can the market
distinguish between long-term and short-term payers
at the time of the initial dividend, or are subsequent
payments determined merely by luck or some other
unpredictable factor? Fifth, to the extent that divi-
dend sustainability can be predicted, can long-run
operating performance also be predicted?
II. Data and Methodology
To construct our sample, we begin with monthly
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data
from 1962 through 2000. For every month within this
period, we group all firms into two categories: those
that pay dividends and those that do not. A firm is
considered to be paying dividends if, at any time
during the preceding 12 months, it has paid any US
cash dividends, which are denoted by distribution
codes ranging from 1200 to 1299.1 Other types of
distributions, including liquidations, foreign currency
dividends, and payments related to mergers and
acquisitions are not included for the purpose of
this study.
We then require that each firm had gone at least 5
years without paying any dividends prior to the
initiation of payments. Similar to Asquith and
Mullins (1983) and Healy and Palepu (1983), the
requirement of a lengthy nonpayment period prior to
initiation suggests that the ensuing dividend is more
of a surprise to investors. This initial dividend need
not be the first in the company’s history, however; it
can also represent a resumption of payments after a
hiatus of at least 5 years. For simplicity, we refer to
the date on which this resumption or initiation was
announced as the ‘initiation announcement date’,
regardless of whether the dividend constituted an
initiation or merely a resumption of payments.
We then determine how long each company
continued to pay dividends following initiation.
Companies that paid dividends for 3 years or less
(including the initial dividend) are classified as
‘temporary payers’, while companies that paid for
more than three but less than or equal to 7 years were
classified as ‘intermediate payers’. Companies that
paid dividends for more than 7 years were considered
to be ‘permanent payers’. All companies with
nonmissing initiation announcement dates were then
merged with the Compustat financial database in
order to obtain accounting figures for long-run
performance evaluation. At this point, the sample
consists of 929 firms. Although we later omit finan-
cial firms, utilities, and intermediate payers for the
purpose of testing, it is in the interest of examining a
larger, more comprehensive group of dividend initi-
ators that we provide some descriptive statistics for
these 929 firms in the next section of this article.
III. Descriptive Statistics
DeAngelo et al. (2004) report that the aggregate level
of real dividends was 16.3% higher in 2000 than it
was in 1978, but find that this is the result of
dividends becoming increasingly concentrated rather
than widely distributed. Although the percentage of
companies paying dividends decreased by the end of
the twentieth century (a finding consistent with Fama
and French (2001), who document that between 1978
and 1999 the percentage of firms paying dividends
decreased from 66.5% to 20.8%), the dividends
1 The distribution code gives an indication of the type and expected frequency of a company’s payments and is utilized
extensively by Brickley (1983). The most common distribution codes encountered in this study are the following: 1212 –
unspecified frequency, 1232 – quarterly dividend, 1242 – semi-annual dividend, 1252 – annual dividend, 1262 – year-end or
final dividend, 1272 – extra or special dividend, and 1292 – nonrecurring dividend. It should be noted that the distribution
code is generally only accurate in the short-run; commonly, firms will declare their dividends to be annual and then switch to
quarterly payments shortly afterward, or vice versa. The distribution code does, however, tend to be consistent with
newspaper reports of management’s stated intentions around the time of the initial dividend announcement.
themselves generally became much larger. Julio and
Ikenberry (2004) show a reversal of this trend; since
2001, more firms have begun making payments, but
the percentage of US firms that pay dividends is still
far less than it was in the 1970s.
There are two potential reasons for this dramatic
decline in the percentage of firms that pay dividends –
companies may have become less likely to initiate
payments, or companies that do initiate may have
become less likely to continue making payments
afterward. Figure 1 corroborates the findings of
Fama and French and also lends support to the first
explanation; between 1978 and 1982, the number of
dividend initiating firms drops from a high of 87 to a
low of 15. Though the number of initiating firms
begins to increase again after 1982, there are still
fewer of them in any 2-year period between 1983 and
1993 than there were in 1978 alone, notwithstanding
the sharp increase in new listings that occurred
after 1978.
In addition to the results presented in Fig. 1, we
also find evidence to support the second explanation
for the ‘disappearing dividends’ phenomenon.
Between 1967 and 1978, there were 381 companies
that initiated dividends. Of these, 134 stopped paying
within 3 years, compared to 86 that paid for between
3 and 7 years and 161 that paid for more than 7 years.
Thus, prior to 1979, if a firm initiated dividends, it
was more likely to continue paying for more than 7
years than it was to stop paying within 3 years.
However, for the 470 dividend initiations between
1979 and 1993 (the last year during which a company
entering our sample can fall under any of the three
categories), temporary payers outnumbered perma-
nent payers 221 to 132, with the other 117 eventually
being classified as intermediate payers. Thus, the fact
that the average company was less likely to be paying
dividends in the mid-1990s than it was in the mid-
1970s appears to stem from two trends that have
taken place over that period of time. Consistent with
Fama and French (2001), companies have become
less likely to initiate dividends. In addition to this first
explanation, however, it appears that the dividends
themselves have become less ‘sticky’ – once initiated,
they are less likely to be sustained for many years
than they were during the 1970s.
IV. Length of Payments and Long-Run
Operating Performance
The signalling theory posits that companies that
initiate dividends are sending a positive signal to the
capital markets regarding high future cash flows and
profits. The credibility of this signal rests with the
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Initiators
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Year
Perm
Int
Temp
Fig. 1. Number of dividend initiators per year and the proportion of temporary, intermediate and permanent Initiators from each
year
prevailing view (c.f. Lintner, 1956) that the initiation
of dividends represents a commitment to sustained
payments. Therefore, the firms that send out a
credible signal – that is, the firms whose expected
future cash positions are high enough to enable
sustained payments – should be the firms that are
most rewarded by investors at the time of the
initiation announcement. Similar to Healy and
Palepu (1986), DeAngelo et al. (1996), and others,
we examine the performance of firms in the years
surrounding dividend initiation. Our study differs
from theirs, however, in that we seek to determine the
relationship between the length of payments and the
operating performance of initiating firms, rather
than examine the ex-post performance of all
initiating firms regardless of payment length.
By separating the companies in this sample into two
groups based on payment length, we can more
deeply explore the credibility aspect of the signalling
theory.
We begin by identifying several variables related to
firm profitability, investment and growth opportu-
nity. Measures of profitability include: (1) operating
income before depreciation, (2) cash flow (defined as
operating income before depreciation minus interest
expense, taxes and preferred dividends), and (3) net
income. Each of these three measures of profitability
is standardized separately by assets, sales and
common equity, yielding a total of nine different
ratios. For simplicity, the results reported in this
article refer to return on assets, defined as operating
income before depreciation scaled by total assets,
unless otherwise stated. The primary measure of
growth and investment that we use is the ratio of the
market value to the book value of the firm’s assets
(hereafter, MTBA). All variables were obtained using
the Compustat database from Wharton Research
Data Services. Finally, we eliminate all financial firms
and utilities as well as all intermediate payers.
Our final sample consists of 553 companies
that initiated dividends between 1967 and 2000.
Of these 553 companies, 240 are classified as
permanent payers and 313 are classified as temporary
payers.
Initially we examine the signalling theory along two
dimensions. First, similar in spirit to DeAngelo et al.
(1996), we investigate the full sample of dividend
initiating firms. The results in Table 1 are generally
inconsistent with the signalling theory. After dividend
initiation, Return On Assets (ROA) (Panel A) tends
to decrease to a level similar to that which existed a
few years before initiation and before much of the
run-up in earnings. The other eight performance
measures (in Panel B) also display a considerable
decline in the subsequent years. Signed-rank tests of
the median change in performance (we focus much of
this study on medians rather than means owing to
outliers in some of the data, particularly for those
measures that are scaled by sales) find a highly
significant decrease following initiation. Thus it
appears that, in the main, dividends do not portend
a sustainably elevated level of performance as posited
by the traditional signalling theory.
However, even though there is a decline in perfor-
mance for the overall sample, it may still be the case
that dividend sustainability relates to performance.
Table 2 compares the two groups of firms
(‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ payers) over time. For
each of the 5 years prior to initiation, the ROA of the
average permanent payer was higher than that of the
average temporary payer. However, the two groups
experienced simultaneous run-ups during these years;
Table 1. Operating performance around dividend initiations
Year N Mean Median
Panel Aa
5 532 11.46% 11.73%
4 546 12.23% 11.92%
3 547 12.72% 12.58%
2 548 13.64% 13.32%
1 548 15.77% 15.10%
0 528 16.02% 15.76%
þ1 494 13.99% 13.92%
þ2 458 13.20% 13.25%
þ3 438 13.15% 13.70%
þ4 432 11.98% 12.76%
þ5 415 12.06% 13.54%
Variable N Median Signed-rank p-value
Panel Bb
ROA 492 1.30% 17 328 <0.0001
ROE 485 2.42% 12 908 <0.0001
ROS 492 0.57% 9689 0.0021
CFA 482 0.65% 14 736 <0.0001
CFE 475 1.84% 13 418 <0.0001
CFS 482 0.27% 9107 0.0028
NIA 492 1.20% 19 449 <0.0001
NIE 485 2.52% 18 124 <0.0001
NIS 492 0.56% 13 883 <0.0001
Notes: aAverage annual ROA from 5 years before initiation
through 5 years after for the full sample of temporary and
permanent payers.
bDifference between the median operating performance 5
years after initiation and performance during the year of
initiation for the full sample (if Year 5 data are missing, the
last year for which data are available is used instead). We
use nine performance measures: return on assets, equity,
and sales, cash flow to assets, equity, and sales, and net
income to assets, equity and sales. We include signed-rank
S-statistics and p-values for the median of each return
measure.
median ROA was about 4% higher in the year
of initiation than it had been 5 years earlier.
Following initiation, however, the groups’ paths
diverge. While the permanent companies experience
a mild tapering of profitability between year zero and
year five, the temporary companies’ ROA drops by
nearly half. By the end of the second year follow-
ing initiation, the ROA of the typical permanent
payer is nearly twice that of the typical temporary
payer. Panel B shows that regardless of which
performance measure we use, the temporary payers
fare worse (even relative to their lower starting
numbers) after initiation than do the permanent
payers.
This result extends the findings of DeAngelo and
DeAngelo (1990) to dividend omissions and shows
that firms with declining operating performance often
cease making payments very quickly after initiation.
On balance, we do not find support for the signalling
theory’s implication that dividends signal a rosy
future for the firms that initiate them. For the full
sample and even for the subsample of permanent
payers, average ROA actually decreases in the 5 years
following initiation. These findings are consistent
with Grullon et al. (2005), who find little correlation
between changes in dividends and subsequent firm
profitability. This suggests that at least on the basis of
ex-post performance, the initiation of dividends
should actually convey negative news to the market.
However, our findings go beyond these studies in that
they also directly address dividend sustainability.
We find that despite the lackluster post-initiation
performance of the full sample, dividend
sustainability is most definitely related to
performance. While the performance results of the
permanent payers are mixed (median ROA falls but
remains higher than it was prior to Year 1), those
of the temporary payers are economically and
statistically much worse. This is an interesting find-
ing, for it raises questions about the market’s reaction
to dividends and the predictability of continued
payments.
Table 2. Operating performance around dividend initiations, by group
Year N Perm. median
performance
N Temp. median
performance
p-value
Panel Aa
5 230 13.47% 302 10.07% 0.0003
4 238 13.71% 308 10.56% 0.0003
3 239 13.39% 308 11.95% 0.0072
2 239 14.00% 309 12.61% 0.0434
1 239 15.84% 309 14.61% 0.1305
0 238 17.44% 290 14.16% <0.0001
þ1 238 17.15% 256 10.56% <0.0001
þ2 239 16.99% 219 8.64% <0.0001
þ3 238 16.32% 200 9.01% <0.0001
þ4 239 15.68% 193 9.02% <0.0001
þ5 239 15.08% 176 10.43% <0.0001
Variable N Chg. Perm p-value N Chg. Temp p-value Perm-Temp p-value
Panel Bb
ROA 238 0.76% 0.0085 254 2.20% <0.0001 1.45% 0.0099
ROE 238 1.65% 0.0399 247 5.60% 0.0002 3.95% 0.0350
ROS 238 0.24% 0.7170 254 1.21% 0.0002 0.98% 0.0046
CFA 233 0.16% 0.2867 249 1.73% <0.0001 1.89% 0.0003
CFE 233 0.28% 0.3815 242 5.29% <0.0001 5.58% 0.0002
CFS 233 0.04% 0.4770 249 1.04% <0.0001 1.08% 0.0001
NIA 238 0.76% 0.0028 254 2.89% <0.0001 3.66% 0.0012
NIE 238 0.99% 0.0027 247 4.65% <0.0001 5.64% 0.0022
NIS 238 0.12% 0.2430 254 1.32% <0.0001 1.44% 0.0011
Notes: aMedian annual ROA from 5 years before initiation through 5 years after for the separate samples of temporary and
permanent payers.
bMedian difference between the operating performance 5 years after initiation and performance during the year of initiation
for the full sample (if Year 5 data are missing, the last year for which data are available is used instead). We use nine
performance measures: return on assets, equity, and sales, cash flow to assets, equity, and sales, and net income to assets,
equity and sales. We include signed-rank S-statistics and p-values for the median of each return measure.
V. Length of Payments and the
Announcement Period Stock Price
Effect
The previous findings show that the firms that go on
to become permanent payers perform better than
those that become temporary payers. Therefore, even
though the group of permanent payers does not
perform particularly well in the post-initiation period,
there is still evidence that dividend sustainability is
directly related to future performance. Given this
result and the prevailing view that dividend initiation
is a positive signal in part because of the implicit
suggestion that the payments will persist, we now
examine whether investors distinguish, at the time of
the initiation announcement, between temporary and
permanent payers.
Table 3 shows the announcement-period abnormal
returns of permanent and temporary companies for
three different window lengths. The first window
(1,10), indicates an abnormal return calculation
for the 10 days just before the initiation announce-
ment. The other windows (1,þ1) and (2,þ2),
respectively represent the 3 days and 5 days sur-
rounding the initiation announcement. To mitigate
the biases associated with bid-ask bounce and
nonsynchronous trading, the average abnormal
returns shown for each event window are calculated
using the buy-and-hold method. Sufficient data were
available to calculate abnormal returns for 305 of the
313 firms in the temporary sample and for 237 of the
240 firms in the permanent sample.
For the permanent payers, Table 3 shows 3-day
and 5-day average abnormal returns of 3.10% and
3.67%, respectively. For the temporary payers, the 3-
and 5-day returns are 3.27% and 3.86%, respectively.
All these figures are statistically significant at the 1%
level, constituting further evidence that investors
respond favourably to dividend initiations.
Additionally, both groups report significant and
positive abnormal returns for the 10 days immedi-
ately preceding the initiation announcement, suggest-
ing that at least some of the news regarding the
dividend is being leaked prior to the announcement
itself.
When the abnormal returns of the permanent
sample are compared to those of the temporary
sample, we find that temporary payers experience
slightly higher abnormal returns for each of the three
event windows. However, the difference is not statis-
tically significant, and thus it does not appear that
investors treat temporary firms differently from
permanent firms at the time of the initiation
announcement.
It is important, at this juncture, to address the issue
of stock repurchases as a potential substitute for
dividend payments. Much research has been con-
ducted in this area, including studies by Grullon and
Michaely (2002) and Brav et al. (2005). In particular,
we focus on our sample of temporary payers in an
effort to answer two questions: first, how pervasive
was the substitution of repurchases for cash dividends
over our period of study?, and second, did the
existence of a repurchase program impact our results?
This is particularly important for the firms we
designate as ‘temporary payers’ – if those firms
ceased paying dividends while at the same time
increased or initiated repurchases, then in reality
they simply replaced one type of cash payment with
another. We found that of the 313 firms in the
temporary sample, 159 (50.8%) had a repurchase
program in place during the 3 years prior to the
omission of dividends. In the 3-year period following
omission, only 34 of those 159 firms increased the
number of shares repurchased. Of the 154 firms that
did not have share repurchase programs in place, just
36 initiated them in the 3 years after dividends were
eliminated. Additionally, more companies actually
decreased the number of shares repurchased after
omission than increased them. To be sure, however,
we alternatively excluded those temporary payers
from the sample that initiated or increased stock
repurchases and then replicated Tables 1–3 (as well as
Tables 4–6 from the following sections of this study)
and obtained the same results as before. Thus stock
Table 3. Announcement period returns
Permanent Temporary
Variable N Mean N Mean Perm-Temp t-statistic p-value
(1,10) 237 1.64% 305 1.76% 0.12% 0.13 0.8934
(1,þ1) 237 3.10% 305 3.27% 0.17% 0.28 0.7812
(2,þ2) 237 3.67% 305 3.86% 0.19% 0.27 0.7884
Notes: Comparison of the announcement-period abnormal returns of the permanent sample to those of the temporary sample.
Returns are derived from the market model of abnormal returns and are cumulated using the buy-and-hold method.
repurchases appear to have little if any impact on the
findings of our study.
VI. Cross-Sectional Determinants of the
Duration of Payments
Up to this point, we have found that even though
permanent payers outperform temporary payers in
the long run, investors seem not to distinguish
between the two groups ex-ante. This raises the
following question: can the duration of dividend
payments be predicted using only information that is
available at the time of the announcement, or is the
separation between temporary and permanent payers
simply an a posteriori phenomenon, whereby certain
companies become luckier and/or more efficiently run
than others, independent of the previous decision to
initiate dividends? If the duration of payments can in
fact be predicted, then the traditional signalling
explanation for the market’s reaction to dividends
can be further called into question. To address this
issue, we begin by selecting a few variables that are
available to investors on or before the date of the
initiation announcement. The investors could then
use this information to form opinions regarding the
announcement.
The first variables that we select are dividend-
specific. Each dividend that a firm pays is accompa-
nied by a ‘distribution code’ at the time of its
announcement. This code states whether the dividend
is to be paid quarterly, semi-annually or annually, or
whether it is an ‘extra’ or ‘special’ distribution and
not likely to be repeated. Brickley (1983) assigns these
distribution codes to two categories: ‘Specially
Designated Dividends’ (SDDs), and regular divi-
dends. SDDs are dividends that the distribution codes
label as extra, special or nonrecurring, while regular
dividends can be expected to continue on a quarterly,
Table 4. Comparison of permanent companies to temporary companies on the basis of pre-initiation period
and dividend-specific information
Permanent Temporary
Variable N Mean N Mean Perm-Temp p-value
Panel A: Means
Mean ROA 239 14.37% 310 12.19% 2.18% 0.0044
Trend ROA 239 3.31% 308 5.13% 1.82% 0.1263
Log assets (1) 239 4.137 311 3.807 0.330 0.0094
MTBA (1) 233 1.291 296 1.334 0.043 0.5949
Debt ratio (1) 233 32.17% 296 31.47% 0.71% 0.7415
Dividend yield 237 1.64% 311 9.16% 7.53% 0.0006
Specified 228 0.5877 247 0.4696 0.1181 0.0099
Regular 240 0.9500 313 0.7891 0.1609 <0.0001
Panel B: Mediansa
Mean ROA 239 14.19% 310 11.91% 2.28% 0.0003
Trend ROA 239 2.88% 308 3.57% 0.69% 0.1126
Log assets (1) 239 3.978 311 3.656 0.322 0.0089
MTBA (1) 233 1.027 296 1.039 0.012 0.7991
Debt ratio (1) 233 29.87% 296 28.41% 1.46% 0.6617
Dividend yield 237 1.28% 311 1.67% 0.39% 0.0003
Specified 228 1.000 247 0.000 1.000 0.0104
Regular 240 1.000 313 1.000 0.000 <0.0001
Notes: Comparison of the pre-initiation period and dividend-specific characteristics of the temporary
sample to those of the permanent sample. Mean ROA represents the firm’s mean return on assets during
the 5 years immediately preceding the initial dividend announcement. Trend ROA represents the change in
the firm’s annual ROA over the pre-initiation period. Log assets, market-to-book ratios, and debt ratios
were calculated for the year immediately preceding the initiation announcement. Dividend yield has been
annualized by incorporating the frequency of payments stated by the distribution code. ‘Regular’ is a
dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if the dividend is not announced to be ‘extra’, ‘special’ or ‘one-
time’, and ‘Specified’ is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if the dividend is of a specified
frequency and a value of 0 if the dividend is of an unspecified frequency but is not announced to be ‘extra’,
‘special’ or ‘one-time’.
aThe t-approximation to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is then used to compare the average rank of the
permanent companies to the average rank of the temporary companies.
semi-annual or annual basis. We expand upon
Brickley’s analysis and divide the ‘regular’ category
into two groups called ‘specified frequency’ and
‘unspecified frequency’. ‘Specified frequency’ divi-
dends are those specified to be quarterly, semi-annual
or annual by their distribution codes. ‘Unspecified
frequency’ dividends do not have a specified fre-
quency of payments (e.g. quarterly, annual), but they
are not labelled as extra or nonrecurring, either.
Assuming that the firm’s announcements regarding
the frequency of future dividend payments have at
least some credibility, we hypothesize that a firm is
most likely to become a permanent payer when its
initial dividend is of a specified frequency. Firms that
do not specify the frequency of their initial dividends
are less likely to become permanent payers, therefore,
and initial dividends labelled ‘extra’, ‘special’ and
‘nonrecurring’ are the least likely to become
permanent.
The second dividend-specific variable we select is
the dividend yield. We define dividend yield to be the
size of the dividend (per share) divided by the stock
price on the date of the initiation announcement. We
then annualize the dividend yield on the basis of the
stated frequency of payments; if the dividend is
announced to be quarterly then we multiply the yield
by four, and if the dividend is announced to be semi-
annual then we multiply the yield by two. We
hypothesize that the higher the dividend yield, the
less likely the firm will be to sustain payments over a
long period of time, owing to the fact that natural
fluctuations in a firm’s cash flow will make a high
cash outlay more difficult to maintain than a low cash
outlay.
For the firm-specific variables, we use measures of
operating performance for the period leading up to
the initiation announcement, as well as the natural
logarithm of total assets, the debt ratio and the
market-to-book ratio, to try and differentiate the two
groups from one another. Although we have nine
different measures of performance, all results
reported in this article are based, for the sake of
 Table 5. Comparison of permanent companies to temporary companies on the basis of pre-initiation period
SD of profitability
Permanent Temporary
Variable N Mean N Mean Perm-Temp p-value
Panel A: Means
SDROA 54 1.88% 134 2.66% 0.78% 0.0023
SDROE 58 5.16% 144 7.38% 1.82% 0.0420
SDROS 65 5.54% 149 37.89% 32.35% 0.0894
SDCFA 41 1.33% 105 1.99% 0.66% 0.0014
SDCFE 45 3.16% 114 5.95% 2.79% 0.0014
SDCFS 50 4.76% 118 43.27% 38.51% 0.1063
SDNIA 77 2.38% 179 3.96% 1.58% 0.0817
SDNIE 154 13.35% 231 10.37% 2.98% 0.6260
SDNIS 201 19.13% 252 41.48% 22.35% 0.2209
Panel B: Mediansa
SDROA 54 1.66% 134 1.91% 0.25% 0.0256
SDROE 58 3.61% 144 4.71% 1.10% 0.0286
SDROS 65 4.65% 149 6.08% 1.43% 0.0020
SDCFA 41 1.12% 105 1.52% 0.40% 0.0328
SDCFE 45 2.55% 114 3.38% 0.83% 0.0075
SDCFS 50 3.34% 118 5.10% 1.76% 0.0133
SDNIA 77 1.67% 179 1.91% 0.24% 0.0359
SDNIE 154 2.66% 231 3.81% 1.15% 0.0029
SDNIS 201 3.74% 252 5.12% 1.38% 0.0007
Notes: Comparison of the pre-initiation period volatility of the temporary sample to that of the permanent
sample. These SDs are derived from Compustat quarterly data and represent the SD of a firm’s
profitability during the pre-period. SD is calculated only for those firms that have data available for at least
15 of the 20 quarters immediately preceding the initiation announcement. SDROA, SDROE, SDROS,
SDCFA, SDCFE, SDCFS, SDNIA, SDNIE and SDNIS represent the pre-initiation period SD of return
on assets, return on equity, return on sales, cash flow on assets, cash flow on equity, cash flow on sales, net
income on assets, net income on equity and net income on sales, respectively.
aThe t-approximation to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is then used to compare the average rank of the
permanent companies to the average rank of the temporary companies.
simplicity, on ROA. We examine performance in two
ways; first, we compute the average return on assets
over the 5 years leading up to the initiation
announcement, and second, we take the difference
between year 5 and year 1. Total assets, the debt
ratio, and the market-to-book ratio are calculated for
the year immediately preceding the initiation
announcement.
Table 4 reports the results from univariate tests of
the differences between the means of the permanent
sample and those of the temporary sample in Panel A
and the differences between the medians of the two
groups in Panel B. Many of these variables are in fact
useful for predicting whether a firm that is initiating
dividends will go on to become a permanent payer.
Large firms, which tend to be well established and
have high cash balances, are more likely than small
firms to continue making payments for 7 years or
more. Firms with low dividend yields and thus a less
demanding cash commitment are also more likely to
become permanent payers. Companies that specify
the frequency of their payments to be quarterly, semi-
annual or annual are much more likely to become
permanent payers than are companies that make no
specification at all, and these two groups together are
much more likely to become permanent payers than
companies that declare their dividends to be extra,
special or one-time payments. Finally, the operating
performance of firms during the pre-initiation period
can be used to predict the sustainability of dividends
after initiation.
We hypothesize that another determinant of the
sustainability of dividends is earnings volatility.
Grullon et al. (2002) find that increases in dividends
correspond to decreases in systematic risk.
Additionally, the firms that increase dividends do
not increase their capital expenditures and in subse-
quent years experience a decrease in profitability.
This suggests that dividend increases signal, above all
else, a maturing on the part of the firm. We address
this topic from a slightly different angle – we examine
the firm in terms of its total risk as measured by the
Table 6. Comparison of permanent companies to temporary companies on the basis of pre-initiation period
risk-adjusted profitability
Permanent Temporary
Variable N Mean N Mean Perm-Temp p-value
Panel A: Means
ROA/SDROA 54 12.21 134 7.75 4.46 0.0017
ROE/SDROE 58 11.81 144 7.05 4.76 0.0002
ROS/SDROS 65 17.31 149 9.85 7.45 0.0006
CFA/SDCFA 41 8.75 105 6.16 2.59 0.0327
CFE/SDCFE 45 9.68 114 5.87 3.81 0.0012
CFS/SDCFS 50 12.27 118 7.39 4.88 0.0036
NIA/SDNIA 77 5.63 179 3.69 1.94 0.0334
NIE/SDNIE 154 5.56 231 3.72 1.84 0.0042
NIS/SDNIS 201 6.31 252 4.25 2.06 0.0016
Panel B: Mediansa
ROA/SDROA 54 8.99 134 6.28 2.71 0.0005
ROE/SDROE 58 8.26 144 6.25 2.01 0.0000
ROS/SDROS 65 12.39 149 7.67 4.71 0.0000
CFA/SDCFA 41 7.20 105 4.70 2.50 0.0100
CFE/SDCFE 45 8.06 114 4.73 3.33 0.0006
CFS/SDCFS 50 9.44 118 5.34 4.09 0.0006
NIA/SDNIA 77 3.59 179 2.08 1.51 0.0184
NIE/SDNIE 154 3.60 231 2.48 1.12 0.0034
NIS/SDNIS 201 3.83 252 2.26 1.57 0.0002
Notes: Comparison of the pre-initiation period volatility of the temporary sample to that of the permanent
sample. These SDs derive from Compustat quarterly data and represent the SD of a firm’s profitability
during the pre-initiation period. SD is calculated only for those firms that have data available for at least 15
of the 20 quarters immediately preceding the initiation announcement. SDROA, SDROE, SDROS,
SDCFA, SDCFE, SDCFS, SDNIA, SDNIE and SDNIS represent the pre-initiation period SD of return
on assets, return on equity, return on sales, cash flow on assets, cash flow on equity, cash flow on sales, net
income on assets, net income on equity and net income on sales, respectively.
aThe t-approximation to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is then used to compare the average rank of the
permanent companies to the average rank of the temporary companies.
SD of profitability in the pre-initiation period. For
the purpose of this study, it is preferable to examine
total risk to systematic risk for two reasons. First,
because unsystematic risk affects the short- and long-
term financial position of firms, it should not be
ignored. Second, it is primarily the managers who
determine their firms’ dividend policies rather than
the market as a whole, and these managers should
incorporate firm-specific risk into their decisions. All
else equal, a firm with a high degree of unsystematic
risk is just as likely to be forced to cease dividend
payments as a firm with less unsystematic risk but the
same amount of total risk.
To calculate the volatility of corporate profits, we
use quarterly data from Compustat to measure the
SD of profitability over the 5 years immediately
preceding the initiation announcement. Only firms
that had data for at least 15 of the 20 pre-initiation
quarters were included in this analysis. We hypoth-
esize that since dividend sustainability requires sta-
bility of earnings (a view consistent with Lintner
(1956) and Bhattacharya (1979)), the firms whose
profits fluctuated most severely in the pre-initiation
period are less likely to become permanent payers
than are the less volatile firms. To adjust for industry
effects, we also subtract each company’s industry-
average SD, based on the first two digits of its
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, from
its own SD over the same time period. Table 5
supports this hypothesis; the temporary payers in the
sample had significantly higher pre-initiation period
performance volatility than did the permanent
payers. Adjusting for industry effects mitigates this
difference to some degree, although for all variables
the temporary payers’ SDs are higher than the
permanent payers’ SDs, and these differences gener-
ally remain significant.
Last, we combine the concepts of risk and return to
produce another univariate separation between per-
manent payers and temporary payers. Even on a
theoretical level, the stability of earnings is not a
completely satisfactory predictor of dividend sustain-
ability, as the following example illustrates. Consider
two companies with the same level of assets. The first
company experienced average operating profits of
$100 per quarter over its pre-initiation period, while
the second averaged $10 000 per quarter. It seems
almost given that between these two companies, the
second would have a higher SD of ROA, and on that
basis would be considered less likely to become a
permanent payer. To correct for this problem, we
compute a measure of risk-adjusted profitability by
dividing each firm’s average pre-initiation period
ROA by the SD of its ROA. Table 6 shows that the
two groups differ significantly in terms of their risk-
adjusted pre-initiation period returns. All nine per-
formance measures are significant at the 5% level,
while seven of them are significant at the 1% level.2
When the median values of the two groups are
substituted for the means, the differences become
slightly more significant. Thus, even though investors
do not distinguish between the two groups a priori,
the temporary payers differ greatly from the perma-
nent payers in their volatility-adjusted performance
during the years leading up to initiation.
VII. A Prediction Model for Payment
Length
In Table 3, we documented a statistically similar
market reaction to the initiation announcements of
temporary and permanent payers. Despite this, there
are several characteristics of both the firm and the
dividend that are available at the time of initiation
that relate to the likelihood of sustained payments.
However, we have not yet attempted to predict, out-
of-sample, which firms will become permanent payers
and which will not. In this section, we create a
prediction model that uses information related to the
firm itself, the initial dividend, and other firms that
had initiated dividends in the past. This model differs
from the preceding analysis in that it explores
whether dividend sustainability is predictable through
time; it tests not only the cross-sectional determinants
of sustainability but also whether trends such as the
overall decrease in dividend stickiness could have
been predicted ahead of time.
We use one of two criteria to predict whether a
given company will become a permanent payer. First,
if the company has enough quarterly accounting data
available to compute its risk-adjusted pre-initiation
period operating performance as defined in the
previous section of this study, then that risk-adjusted
performance is compared with the risk-adjusted
performance of the previous 50 dividend initiators.
If this risk-adjusted performance is higher than the
2 In addition to the analysis presented here, we analysed a subset of the sample in which all companies with stock prices of less
than $5 or total assets of less than $10 million were excluded. Not surprisingly, a disproportionate number of these firms
(more than two-thirds) were later defined as Temporary payers. When these firms are removed from the study, some of the
size-related variables in Table 2, as well as the ‘specified’ dummy variable, become insignificant, suggesting that some of the
predictability of payment length is concentrated within the very smallest firms. However, the results in Tables 3 and 4, as well
as those of the subsequent tables in this study, remain largely unchanged.
average of the past 50 initiators, the company is
predicted to become a permanent payer; otherwise,
the company is predicted to cease payments within 3
years. Second, if the company does not have enough
quarterly data available to compute a risk-adjusted
pre-initiation period return, then a logistic regression
is estimated on the basis of the other firm- and
dividend-specific variables and then used to predict
whether that company will become a permanent
payer. In this manner, the primary model that we use
remains simple while the rolling logistic model is
reserved for cases where the quarterly data are scarce
but other useful information is available.
For these logistic regressions, we begin by sorting
the data set by the date of the first dividend payment
and then using the first 50 firms as a benchmark for
analysing future dividend initiations. We then esti-
mate a logistic regression across these 50 firms using
the following independent variables: firm size, defined
as the natural logarithm of total assets in the year
immediately preceding initiation; the annualized div-
idend yield; a distribution code dummy, entitled
‘regular’, which takes a value of 1 if the distribution
code does not specify the dividend to be ‘extra’,
‘special’ or ‘one-time’ and a value of 0 otherwise; the
average ROA in the pre-initiation period, using
annual data from Compustat; and the market-to-
book and debt ratios for the year immediately
preceding initiation.
We then use the coefficients from this regression
for both explanatory and predictive purposes. In
order to make our predictions of which firms will
become permanent payers truly out of sample, we
first look 8 years beyond the initiation date of the
50th company. This ensures that each of the first 50
firms in the sample will have been established as
either a temporary or permanent payer by that time.
We then take the coefficients from the original
logistic regression and apply them to the first
company to initiate dividends eight or more years
after the 50th firm had initiated (this is the 306th firm
in our entire sample to initiate payments). The model
then moves forward through time in the following
manner. Another logistic regression is estimated for
the second company to initiate dividends after the 8
year period has passed (the 307th initiator from the
larger sample), but this regression replaces the 1st
company in the estimation sample with the 51st
company. The new regression coefficients are then
applied to make a second prediction. The model
continues to evolve in this manner, with the oldest
remaining firm in the estimation sample being
replaced at each step with the first company to
initiate afterwards, thereby keeping a total of 50 firms
in each regression. Each company in the prediction
sample is forecasted to become a permanent payer if
the predicted probability of permanence is greater
than 50%.
We made predictions for a total of 243 companies
that initiated dividends after July 1981. Of these 243
companies, 172 had sufficient accounting data avail-
able to make the prediction on the basis of risk-
adjusted pre-initiation period performance alone.
Predictions for the other 71 were made using the
logistic regression coefficients of previous initiators.
Using this model, we were able to correctly predict
150 of the 243 out-of-sample firms. This result is
significant at the 1% level (t-statistic¼ 3.66) if one
assumes the null model forecasts each firm with a
50% probability of success. Given the dramatic
decrease in the stickiness of dividends during the
late 1970s, one could assume a less than 50%
probability of success for the null, given that it
might predict more permanent payers than temporary
payers on the basis of older data. In any event, this
bias would likely strengthen our model rather than
weaken it.
Although the coefficients of our logistic model
change with each firm in the sample (and are
computed only for those firms that have no risk-
adjusted performance calculation), it is important to
determine, overall, which of these variables are the
most useful in prediction. Table 7 shows the results of
a logistic regression estimated over all 243 companies
in our prediction sample. Using different combina-
tions of these variables, it appears that firm size, risk-
adjusted pre-initiation period performance, dividend
yield, and the specification of payments as ‘regular’
(i.e. not ‘extra’, ‘special’ or ‘one-time’) are most
important in determining whether an initiating firm
will continue to make payments for more than 7
years. This does not come as much of a surprise,
given that these variables were among the most
significant when tested individually. When risk-
adjusted performance is omitted from the regression,
the SD of performance becomes marginally signifi-
cant, with the more volatile firms being more likely to
cease payments within 3 years of initiation.
VIII. Predicting Future Operating
Performance
Our final area of inquiry is the model’s ability to
predict, again out-of-sample, which firms will per-
form best after the dividend initiation. First we
examine the model by comparing the firms that we
had predicted to become permanent payers to those
we had predicted to become temporary payers.
The results are given in Table 8. Panel A shows that
for most measures of operating performance, the
firms that we had predicted to become permanent
payers do significantly better in the years following
initiation than the companies we had predicted to
become temporary payers; for example, the firms that
we predicted to become permanent payers experi-
enced an average annual ROA of 15.42% in the 5
years subsequent to initiation, while the firms that we
predicted to become temporary payers experienced an
average annual ROA of less than 7%. Panel B shows
comparisons of the medians rather than the means,
and for all nine performance measures, the predicted
permanent payers do significantly better than the
predicted temporary payers.3 This suggests that not
only is there a relationship between payment length
and variables such as pre-initiation period
performance, dividend yield and the stated frequency
of payments, but that this relationship extends to
future performance as well.4
IX. Conclusions
We interpret the above results as evidence that the
market’s reaction to the likelihood of dividend
sustainability is inconsistent with the signalling
theory. Although dividend sustainability is positively
related to the future operating performance of the
firm, investors do not differentiate ex-ante between
permanent and temporary payers, even though such a
differentiation can be made on the basis of past
performance, earnings volatility, firm size and
 Table 7. Logistic regressions of portfolio (temporary versus permanent) on pre-initiation data and
dividend characteristics
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variable p-value p-value p-value p-value
Intercept 3.4302 2.9365 1.7505 1.0998
0.0039 0.0261 0.1043 0.3594
Log assets (1) 0.3348 0.3305 0.4784 0.4747
0.0272 0.0306 0.0121 0.0127
ROA/SDROA 0.0437 0.0574
0.0737 0.0621
Mean ROA 2.5277 0.2165
0.3029 0.9672
SDROA 24.511 30.7249
0.1209 0.1203
MTBA (1) 0.1913 0.1164 0.1668 0.0029
0.3835 0.6230 0.5354 0.9912
Debt ratio (1) 1.3014 1.1959 1.6095 1.3836
0.1998 0.2425 0.1876 0.2381
Regular 2.1593 2.1076
0.0031 0.0035
Specified 0.0801 0.0820
0.8665 0.8623
Dividend yield 36.698 34.9121 49.9316 44.2488
0.0633 0.0636 0.0778 0.0889
Note: Regression coefficients correspond to the probability that a dividend-initiating firm will
become a permanent payer.
3 In an alternative analysis, we address the skewness of some of the performance measures shown in Table 6 by Winsorizing
them at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The results for the performance measures that are standardized by sales all become
stronger, with Net Income divided by Sales attaining significance at the 1% level and Return on Sales attaining significance at
the 10% level.
4 Additionally, we exclude from the sub-sample of 313 temporary payers nine companies that were delisted from CRSP within
a year and a half of their final recorded dividend payments. These firms experienced abnormally poor post-initiation period
performance, and in some cases this poor performance was the stated reason for the delisting. The results in Table 6 weaken
considerably when such companies are removed from the sample; although the median post-initiation period performance of
the predicted permanent payers is significantly higher than that of the predicted temporary payers for most measures, the
means are not significantly different at the 10% level for six of the nine measures. However, the results in Tables 2 through 5
remain unchanged, suggesting that these cases of severe post-initiation performance failure do not drive the predictability of
payment length at the time of the initiation announcement.
information specific to the initial dividend itself.
Moreover, our out-of-sample prediction model also
successfully forecasts operating performance; the
firms we predict to become permanent payers using
data available to the market at the time of the
initiation announcement significantly outperform the
firms we predict to become temporary payers. This
can be viewed as further evidence against the tradi-
tional signalling theory in one of two ways; either
dividends convey little if any new information to
investors about future profitability, or the market is
inefficient in its interpretation of managers’ signals.
With regard to the latter possibility, it may be a
fruitful avenue for future research to explore long-
term stock price performance in addition to the
measures of operating performance examined here. In
either case, however, we find no evidence that the
positive market reaction to dividends can be attrib-
uted to the signal of a long-term commitment by the
firms that initiate them.
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